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I.

INTRODUCTION

The district court found and Bonner County concedes that the Board of County
Commissioners for Bonner County (“Board”) committed error in granting Stejer’s, Inc.’s
application for three setback variances (“Variances”) for existing illegal structures. The primary
issue for this Court’s consideration is whether Appellants (the “Hungates”) can show the Board’s
erroneous Decision to grant the Variances prejudices their substantial rights. 1
To understand how the Variances prejudice the Hungates, who own the adjacent property,
it is necessary to understand some key facts about how Stejer’s, Inc.’s property looks with and
without the Variances. Without the Variances, the Green Building, illegally constructed as a large
six-bedroom duplex across two parcels and encroaching on both the rear and the front setbacks, 2
must either be removed entirely or rebuilt on a smaller footprint by removing 19 feet on the rear
side and removing eight feet on the front side (facing the Hungates). R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 265, 448.
Without the Variances, the Beige Building, illegally constructed as a three-bedroom structure and
encroaching on the front setback, must either be removed entirely or rebuilt on a smaller footprint
by removing 18 feet on the front side (facing the Hungates). R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 265, 448. Neither
building may be used as a residence at all in its current location because it does not meet residential
setbacks. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 265. Without the Variances, neither building can simply be “moved
back” because there is not room so the size will necessarily decrease; the Green Building already

1

The factual and procedural background of this matter are detailed in Appellants’ Brief and will not be repeated
herein. Capitalized terms defined in the Appellants’ Brief shall have the same meaning herein.
2
Actually, the Green Building encroaches on three setbacks, but a boundary adjustment is proposed to correct one of
these deficiencies.
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straddles both setbacks, and the Beige Building is crowded by another structure illegally
constructed as a two-bedroom bunkhouse, the Yellow Building.
These property changes are significant, and they have significant impacts on the Hungates’
use, ownership, enjoyment, and value of their adjacent property. Respondents’ arguments that the
Variances have no real impact because they only bless what is already there or because variances
do not affect safety, aesthetics, views, privacy, allowed use, or intensity of use, fail to acknowledge
the enormity of the changes that will occur when the property is brought into conformance with
applicable zoning codes.
Several factual misstatements by Respondents warrant correction: Contrary to
Respondents’ assertions (Resp’t Br., p. 11; Intervenor’s Br., p. 3), Stejer’s, Inc. built five dwelling
units where three are allowed. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 447. 3 Bonner County’s assertion that Stejer’s, Inc.
“voluntarily reported” its illegal building and development activity (Resp’t Br., p. 7) is
contradicted by the Record; the County and Health District issued Notices of Violation. R. Vol. 1,
Ex. pp. 142, 444–45, 474. Bonner County’s statement that the “previous owner” committed the

illegal building and zoning violations on Stejer’s, Inc.’s property (Resp’t Br., p. 5) is also incorrect;
the same applicant for the Variances has owned the Stejer’s, Inc. property since 1981, throughout
all of the illegal building activity. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 233–35.

3

Following a notice of violation from Panhandle Health District, Stejer’s, Inc. executed a Consent Order that states
five dwelling units (three single-family dwellings and one duplex dwelling) were constructed on Stejer’s, Inc.’s three
parcels.
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The Respondents’ statements that the Hungates did not complain to the County about the
decades of illegal building are irrelevant and disingenuous. The Variances were the first permits
Stejer’s, Inc. sought in connection with the development of its property that allowed for public
input, and the Hungates fully participated. Before the Board, the Hungates provided legal argument
as to why the Variances did not meet the applicable statutory standards, and they also voiced the
harm that granting the Variances would cause.
The Board erroneously granted the Variances in violation of its own Code, as conceded by
Bonner County and waived by Stejer’s Inc. That erroneous Decision has significant impacts on
the Hungates, causing them prejudice. As discussed in more detail herein, the Respondents’
arguments that the Hungates have not adequately shown prejudice are unsupported and
unpersuasive.
II.

REPLY ARGUMENT

The Hungates must do two things to set the Board’s Decision aside: (i) establish the Board
erred in one of the ways specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); and (ii) show the Decision has the
potential to prejudice the Hungates. I.C. § 67-5279(3); Hawkins v. Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011).
A.

The Board committed error under Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); Bonner County
concedes this point and Stejer’s, Inc. has waived any argument to the contrary.
The Hungates have raised the issue: “Did the Board commit reversible error in a manner

specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3)?” Appellants’ Br., p. 8. The district court held that Respondents
waived any argument that the Variances were not granted in error and that the Board actually
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committed error by granting the Variances because the Decision was made in violation of
applicable statutes and not supported by evidence. R. Vol. 1, pp. 177–79.
Bonner County agrees, stating: “In the District Court, Bonner County conceded that the
BOCC approved application V-468-17 in error.” Resp’t Br., p. 8; see also Resp’t Br., p. 19 (“From
the outset, counsel for Bonner County acknowledged the BOCC’s decision granting application
V-486-17 violated I.C. § 67-5279(3)…”).
Stejer’s, Inc. has not challenged the district court’s holding as to waiver or the district
court’s holding that the Board actually committed error. Stejer’s, Inc.’s briefing on appeal
specifically states: “The Intervenors do not assert any additional issues on appeal.” Intervenor’s
Br., p. 5. Despite not raising this issue on appeal, Stejer’s, Inc.’s brief to this Court includes some
general statements, made without support, that the Board correctly determined that the Variance
met the applicable standards, and the Decision was not issued in error. Intervenor’s Br., pp. 15-19.
Stejer’s, Inc.’s argument is nearly identical to that made to the district court, 4 and the district court
correctly found Stejer’s, Inc. waived any argument that the Decision was not made in error. See R.
Vol. 1, pp. 177–78. Stejer’s, Inc.’s argument fails for the same reasons on appeal.
Stejer’s, Inc. has waived any argument that the Board did not err in granting the Variances
because Stejer’s, Inc. has failed to support this argument, and “a party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking”. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 87, 967 P.2d 284,
289 (1998). Stejer’s, Inc. only makes generalized and conclusory statements that the Decision was

4

Compare Intervenor’s Br., pp. 15–19, with R. Vol. 1, pp. 136–39.
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not made in error. Stejer’s, Inc. does not address any of the specific reversible errors the Hungates
raised. Steger’s, Inc.’s failure to provide argument or authority on the issue of error or to challenge
the district court’s holdings is fatal. See Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cty. Planning & Zoning,
150 Idaho 231, 235–36, 245 P.3d 983, 987–88 (2010) (holding, in an appeal from a judicial review,
that where a petitioner failed to challenge the district court’s finding regarding prejudice, this Court
need not review it).
Additionally, by failing to respond with argument and authority to each of the errors raised
and supported by the Hungates, Stejer’s, Inc. has waived any argument that the Board did not
commit error under Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, n.6,
241 P.3d 972, 978, n.6 (2010) (issues not addressed by respondent in responsive briefing waived
because I.A.R. 35(b)(c) requires responsive briefing to “contain the contentions of the respondent
with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon”).
Lastly, the Record clearly establishes that the Board committed error under Idaho Code
§ 67-5279(3). R. Vol. 1, pp. 87–104. Such errors are so obvious that the County has not elected to
contest the errors the Hungates identified.
In sum, the district court held the Board committed error, the County concedes reversible
error, Stejer’s, Inc. has waived any argument that the Board did not err under Idaho Code
§ 67-5279(3), and the Record shows that the Board did in fact commit reversible error.
Accordingly, the only remaining issue for this Court is whether the Decision prejudices the
Hungates.
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B.

The Board’s Decision granting the Variances prejudices the Hungates’ substantial
rights.
To set the Board’s Decision aside, Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) requires the Hungates show

the Decision potentially prejudices the Hungates’ substantial rights. 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise,
158 Idaho 12, 19, 343 P.3d 41, 48 (2015). To show prejudice, “[t]he petitioner opposing a permit
must be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a reduction
in the opponent’s land value or interference with his or her use or ownership of the land.” Hawkins,
151 Idaho at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229 (citing Price v. Payette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 131 Idaho
426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998)). When analyzing whether rights are potentially prejudiced, it
is “instructive to look to law relating to property rights, nuisance, and trespass …” Id.
Prejudice is a requirement from the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code
§§ 67-5201 et seq. (“IDAPA”) and is only required to be shown when judicially reviewing an
administrative decision. I.C. § 67-5279(4). Idaho Code § 67-5279 looks at whether the “agency
action” prejudiced the petitioner’s substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4). In this case, the “agency
action” is the Decision granting all three Variances. Prejudice under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) is
analyzed by looking at the entire record. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19, 343 P.3d at 48.
Bonner County and Stejer’s, Inc. have each raised arguments that the Variances did not
prejudice the Hungates. These arguments lack merit for the reasons set forth below.
1.

A variance authorizing overbuilt residential structures on property zoned
residential can prejudice adjacent land owners, and the Variances prejudice
the Hungates.

Bonner County argues a variance authorizing a residential structure in a residential zone
cannot cause prejudice by increasing intensity of use or traffic volumes because the residential use
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is allowed, and a variance only modifies “size, location, or shape of a structure.” Resp’t Br.,
pp. 10–11. Distilled down, Bonner County’s argument is that because residential use is allowed in
the R-5 Zone, even if the Hungates prevail, Stejer’s, Inc. could construct conforming residential
structures to accommodate the same number of people causing the same intensity of use and traffic.
For this reason, Bonner County argues the Hungates cannot show prejudice caused by the
Variances due to increased intensity of use and traffic volumes. This argument lacks merit, ignores
facts in the Record, and asks the Court to ignore reality.
First, in this case, the Variances do facilitate an actual change of use from a low impact
accessory uses to a high impact residential uses. See R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 265 (wherein Bonner
County’s planning staff states that the Variances are “necessary because the ability to convert each
structure to a single family dwelling depends on the reduction of setback requirements”). 5 As to
the Green Building specifically, the Variances sought (a six-foot rear yard setback where 25 feet
is required and a 17-foot front yard setback where 25 feet is required) are literally to change the
use of the structure that was permitted as a storage facility. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 264 (wherein Bonner
County planning staff notes that these variances are for the purpose of “authorizing the conversion
of a permitted storage building into a single family residence”).
Without the Variances, Stejer’s, Inc. cannot get the necessary change of use permit to use
the Green Building as a residence or use the Beige Building as a residence. The Bonner County
Code recognizes that residential use is more intensive than accessory storage use by reducing the

5
In testimony before the Board, Stejer’s, Inc.’s engineer, Mr. Martin Taylor, acknowledged that the Variances are
required to change the use of the existing illegal structures. See R. Vol. 1, Ex. p 106.
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rear yard setback to five feet for detached residential accessory structures. BCRC § 12-411(12).
Therefore, contrary to Bonner County’s argument that variances do not effect use, in this case the
Variances clearly do, and the change in use facilitated by the Variances will be more intensive;
thus, prejudicing the Hungates.
Second, a variance authorizing a structure to be built much larger than the property and the
zoning code allows affects the intensity of the use allowed. In this respect, Bonner County’s
argument ignores reality. A 4,000 square foot structure 6 will accommodate more users than a 1,000
square foot structure. More users means more cars and more vehicle trips over the Hungates’ land
on Thistledo Lane, causing more noise, more dust, and increasing traffic-related safety concerns
on the single-lane gravel road. In Hawkins, this Court acknowledged the practical realities of
redeveloping two unoccupied residences with frontage variances, stating: “We acknowledge that
it is possible for the [applicants] to begin using the spur road more often now that they have
variances allowing them to construct new houses.” Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229.
While variances cannot change an allowed use on their own, they can change the magnitude and
intensity of a use. That is precisely what the Variances do in this case.
Additionally, there is no support for Bonner County’s assertion that Stejer’s, Inc. could
construct single-family residential structures outside of the applicable setbacks that could
accommodate the same number of people as the current illegal structures. In fact, there is evidence
in the Record to the contrary. Stejer’s, Inc.’s engineer, Mr. Martin Taylor, testified: “if you put a

6

The Green Building duplex, as currently constructed, has roughly 4,000 square feet of living space. R. Vol. 1, pp. 416,
454–55.
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scale on this map, you’d see that by the time we factor in the 25-foot front and rear yard setbacks,
we almost have negative building envelopes. That means we have no room to do anything absent
some variance.” R. Vol. 1, at p. 35; see also R. Vol. 1, p. 23 (wherein Bonner County’s planning
staff notes that Tax Parcel 9 and Tax Parcel 10 have tight building envelopes).
Lastly, Bonner County’s argument also ignores the fact that the Variances place the
residential structures closer to the Hungates, depriving the Hungates of the benefits and property
rights attendant to setbacks. See Appellants’ Br., p. 16–20.
The Variances allow structures that are much larger than could legally be constructed. The
larger structures support more intensive use. The more intensive use is further aggravated by the
fact that the Variances allow these large structures to exist well within the applicable setbacks,
closer to the Hungates. Simply put, while the Variances may only allow modification to the size,
location, or shape of a structure, those modifications have a significant impact on the Hungates’
neighboring property. For these reasons, the Variances can, and do (see Appellants’ Br., pp. 16–
19), prejudice the Hungates by infringing on views and privacy, increasing the intensity of use and
traffic volumes, and creating an unsightly and overbuilt environment.
2.

A variance from zoning setbacks authorizing residential structures to crowd
street frontages and neighboring residences can prejudice adjacent land
owners, and the Variances in this case do prejudice the Hungates.

Because the BCRC does not regulate aesthetic standards for residential structures, Bonner
County argues the Hungates cannot show prejudice due to the fact that the Green Building and the
Beige Building are unsightly and out of character with the surroundings. Resp’t Br., pp. 10, 12.
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Bonner County’s argument ignores the fact that aesthetics include more than just building
materials and architectural design. Aesthetics also include building orientation and location. Courts
have consistently held that residential zoning setbacks protect the attractiveness and overall
aesthetic of residential property. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927) (recognizing that
residential setbacks “add to the attractiveness and comfort of a residential district”); see also City
of Leadville v. Rood, 198 Colo. 328, 330, 600 P.2d 62, 63 (1979) (requiring a garage illegally
constructed in the setback be removed and noting that the benefits of setbacks “include the
enhancement of the aesthetic value”); Fox v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 450 So. 2d 559, 561,
n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that “[e]nhance[ing] aesthetic values” is one of the “generally
accepted justifications” for setbacks).
Illegally building in setbacks prejudices adjacent landowners by depriving them of the
neighborhood aesthetic imposed and protected by setbacks. The Record shows the Variances do
prejudice the Hungates by allowing Stejer’s, Inc.’s unsightly structures in locations that are highly
visible and out of character with the residential neighborhood. See R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 50 (testimony
of Frank Hungate that the Beige Building is right on Thistledo Lane versus other residential
structures in the area that are “laid back into the woods”); R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 402 (written testimony
of John and Lydia Hungate: “When we have company, after they drive by the large beige building
along the side of the road and see the large green duplex facing our property, they express shock
seeing such high density in a rural area. The buildings are out of conformity to the buildings
nearby.”)
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For these reasons, the Variances can, and do, prejudice the Hungates by depriving them of
the aesthetic benefits attendant to setback minimums. This negatively affects property values and
use and enjoyment.
3.

The Hungates have not waived any arguments to show prejudice.
(a)

No arguments were waived by failing to present evidence of prejudice to
the Board.

Bonner County argues the Hungates waived the ability to allege prejudice based on
reduction in land value because the Hungates failed to show or allege how the Variances would
reduce their property values before the Board. Resp’t Br., pp. 12–13. In support, Bonner County
cites: Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007)
(“This Court will not consider issues that were not raised before the district court even if those
issues had been raised in the administrative proceeding.”) and Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of
Fremont Cty., 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006) (“Therefore, this Court will not
consider on appeal any issue not raised below.”).
Neither case supports Bonner County’s waiver argument. First, there was written testimony
before the Board that the Variances would harm property values. Second, the Hungates did raise
and argue prejudice before the district court. Third, both cases cited by Bonner County address
substantive claims of error resulting from alleged due process violations. Establishing prejudice
under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) is fundamentally different than establishing a due process error
because prejudice from an agency decision is only relevant on judicial review. This Court has
never held that a petitioner must affirmatively raise prejudice as an issue before a land use board
in order to later seek review.
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Instead, this Court looks at the record as a whole to determine if the agency action causes
prejudice. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19, 343 P.3d at 48 (“The record before the Commission sets forth
substantial evidence supporting Lusk’s claim of potential prejudice to its substantial rights.”);
I.C. § 67-5279(4). It is certainly the Hungates’ obligation to raise prejudice at the district court
level and provide support for the same. See Krempasky, 150 Idaho at 236, 245 P.3d at 988 (stating
that a petitioner in a judicial review must assert prejudice and support the allegation of prejudice
with authority). The Hungates’ opening brief on judicial review satisfied this obligation by raising
prejudice as an issue and providing argument and citation to the Record and legal authorities to
show prejudice. R. Vol. 1, pp. 83, 104–05. The Hungates have not waived any argument that the
Variances substantially prejudice their rights.
(b)

No arguments were waived by failing to provide a “nexus” between
prejudice to use and enjoyment and property values before the district court.

Bonner County also argues that prejudice caused by negative impacts to use, ownership,
and enjoyment cannot be used to show decreased property values because the Hungates did not
provide a nexus between the harm suffered and the reduced property values. Resp’t Br., pp. 13–
14. Bonner County does not support this nexus argument with any authority whatsoever. The
Hungates have not waived any arguments to establish prejudice for the reasons stated above.
Additionally, Bonner County’s nexus argument loses sight of the forest for the trees. All
the Hungates need to show to set aside the Board’s erroneous Decision is potential prejudice to a
substantial right. There is no bright line test to show prejudice under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4).
Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232, 254 P.3d at 1228. This Court has indicated prejudice could be shown
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through a reduction in land value or an interference with use, ownership, or enjoyment. Id. The
Court has not elevated one particular factor over another nor has the Court suggested value and
use and enjoyment are the exclusive means to demonstrate prejudice. To show prejudice, the
Hungates have consistently argued the Variances reduce their land values and interfere with their
use and enjoyment. R. Vol. 1, pp. 104–05, 149–55; Appellants’ Br., pp. 11–19. Both arguments
overlap. Diminished use and enjoyment also show a reduction in value by making the property
less marketable. Bonner County’s nexus argument is unsupported, lacks merit, and should be
rejected.
4.

The Hungates have shown prejudice on judicial review and the Record shows
the Variances potentially prejudice the Hungates’ substantial rights.

Bonner County argues the Hungates have failed to show prejudice due to reduced privacy,
safety, reduced enjoyment of wildlife and scenic views, and impacts on adjacent wetlands and
water quality. Resp’t Br., pp. 14–18. 7 Bonner County’s argument should be rejected because
evidence was presented to the Board, is included in the Record, and was compiled for the district
court showing that the Variances prejudice the Hungates’ rights, including privacy, safety,
enjoyment of wildlife, scenic views, and impacts on adjacent wetlands and water quality.
As to privacy, Bonner County takes an improperly narrow view, stating the Hungates must
show how the actual location of Stejer’s, Inc.’s structures authorized by the Variances impacts
privacy. It is the agency action as a whole that must be considered when analyzing prejudice.
I.C. § 67-5279(4). Here the agency action approved the Variances, which allow more and

7

Stejer’s, Inc. raises similar arguments with less detail and analysis. See Intervenor’s Br., pp. 12–14.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 13

significantly larger structures, and closer to the Hungates’ property, than those that could be legally
built outside of the setbacks. The Record shows that the current location of the Stejer’s, Inc.’s
structures negatively impact privacy. See e.g. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 396 (written testimony of Cathy
Miller stating: “The crow[d]ed condition that already exists causes a lack of privacy.”); R. Vol. 1,
Ex. p. 412 (written testimony of neighbor Stephanie Cox that setbacks protect the privacy of
neighbors). In addition, the increased intensity of use allowed by the Variances negatively affects
privacy and use and enjoyment by increasing traffic and noise on Thistledo Lane adjacent to the
Hungates’ property.
As to safety, Bonner County asserts the Hungates failed to “provide actual proof” to show
prejudice from diminished safety. Resp’t Br., p. 15. Actual proof is not the standard. The Hungates
must only show the Variances potentially put them in jeopardy of harm. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at
232, 254 P.3d at 1228.
The Hungates have done more than merely allege adverse safety consequences caused by
the Variances. The Hungates have directed the district court and this Court to evidence in the
Record showing adverse safety consequences resulting from the Variances. See e.g. R. Vol. 1, Ex.
p. 412 (written testimony of neighbor Stephanie Cox that setbacks protect safety and a variance
along the Thistledo Lane frontage is unsafe because people walk and children play in the gravel
access easement); R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 341 (written testimony from Ken and Sarah Stoner providing
that they have concerns about the amount of two-way traffic on the single lane Thistledo Lane and
that the Beige Building is already close to Thistledo Lane); R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 394 (written testimony
from appellant Eleanor Jones stating: “Thistledo Lane, the dead-end road, coming down to these
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properties is narrow and the only access/egress route via foot or wheels. Turn-around space is
already limited, especially for large vehicles. There are safety concerns for the adults and children
even now … Non-approval will prevent creating additional density of buildings, people, and
traffic”). This evidence in the Record satisfies the standards set forth in Hawkins and Lusk.
Just like privacy and safety, the Hungates have shown that the Variances potentially
interfere with their use of their property by negatively impacting scenic views, wetlands, and water
quality. See e.g. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 410 (written testimony from appellant Frank Hungate stating:
“Since then, we have lost our view of the wetlands due to two buildings being built that are multilevel and crowd the boundaries of the neighboring lot.”); See also R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 148–49, 395,
401, 402, 443, 576 (testimony that sewage facilities may not support the intensity of use attendant
to the size of Stejer’s, Inc.’s structures facilitated by the Variances); R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 412, 576,
578 (testimony that Stejer’s, Inc.’s structures have a negative impact on the adjacent wetlands and
water quality).
In sum, the Hungates have made an adequate showing of prejudice for this Court to reverse
the erroneous Decision of the Board.
5.

Granting a Variance for an existing illegal nonconforming structure can cause
prejudice to a substantial right.

Relying on Hawkins, Stejer’s, Inc. argues that because the Variances approve existing
structures in their current location, the Variances cannot cause prejudice because they do not result
in a changed condition or circumstance. Intervenor’s Br., pp. 13–14. This argument lacks merit
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and is not supported by Hawkins for the reasons already briefed by the Hungates. See Appellants’
Br., pp. 14–15.
Stejer’s, Inc. also relies on Hawkins to argue the Hungates cannot be prejudiced in this case
because: “In this circumstance, as in Hawkins, the parcels are ‘legal’ non-conforming parcels
based on the creation of the parcel sizes prior to the present zoning ordinance’s larger size
requirement.” Intervenor’s Br., p. 12. Stejer’s, Inc. fails to recognize the crucial difference between
a nonconforming lot and a nonconforming structure. 8 This case is not analogous to Hawkins
because unlike the existing homes in Hawkins that were constructed prior to any zoning ordinance
(i.e., grandfathered), Stejer’s, Inc.’s illegal structures are not legal nonconforming structures.
Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 230, 254 P.3d at 1226. Stejer’s, Inc.’s structures are illegal and
nonconforming because they were built without proper permits and well into the setbacks, in
violation of Bonner County’s zoning ordinance that existed at the time they were constructed. See
generally Appellants’ Br., pp. 2–6 (summarizing the improper siting and construction of the Green
Building and Beige Building). This distinction is crucial. As noted in Hawkins, the variance
requested was not even necessary because the use and structures were grandfathered. Hawkins,
151 Idaho at 230, 254 P.3d at 1226. While Stejer’s, Inc.’s lots may be legal nonconforming, the
structures are not, and the Variances allowing the structures to remain in the current configuration
prejudice the Hungates.

8

The BCRC recognizes the distinction between a nonconforming lot and a nonconforming structure and requires that
structures built on nonconforming lots must still comply with the applicable setback standards. See BCRC § 12-342(A)
(“The minimum site area requirements will apply in all districts, except that these regulations shall not prohibit
permitted uses on a lot of record (i.e., lots divided prior to the date of this section). All structures will meet minimum
setback requirements as provided in this title.”).
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6.

The district court improperly analyzed prejudice to the Hungates, and the
County’s argument to the contrary lacks merit.

The Hungates’ opening brief demonstrates the district court’s error in evaluating prejudice
under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). See Appellants’ Br., pp. 12–15. The district court’s prejudice
analysis was flawed because it failed to take into consideration the fact that Stejer’s, Inc.’s
structures and uses are illegal, nonconforming, and should not be there in the first place and would
not be there without the Variances.
Bonner County argues the district court properly “focused on the difference between the
value of the Hungate properties before Stejer’s built additional structures and afterwards …”
Resp’t Br., p. 18. This is incorrect.
The district court concluded that “given that these structures have been place for 20 years.
The variance, if granted, merely provides Board approval of a long-existing situation.” R. Vol. 1,
pp. 181, 183. The Variances do more than that, however. The Variances convert two illegal
nonconforming structures that were built without proper permits into legal conforming structures.
Without the Variances, Stejer’s, Inc.’s illegal structures and uses would need to be terminated or
brought into conformance. See Wohrle v. Kootenai Cty., 147 Idaho 267, 276, 207 P.3d 998, 1007
(2009) (upholding the denial of a variance and requiring the removal of illegal nonconforming
docks built in setbacks). The district court did not properly analyze prejudice because it viewed
the Variances as maintaining the status quo. The Variances do more than maintain the status quo,
and the district court’s analysis was in error.
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C.

The Hungates are entitled to their attorney fees and costs before the district court and
this Court on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117.
In a proceeding, including on appeal, where a “political subdivision and a person” are

adverse, the court “shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law.” I.C. § 12-117(1). For the reasons set forth in the Hungates’ opening brief, this Court
should award the Hungates their attorney fees and costs from the district court and on appeal. See
Appellants’ Br., pp. 20–22.
Bonner County argues that fees should not be awarded to the Hungates under I.C. § 12-117
in this case because Bonner County has acted reasonably by acknowledging the Board’s Decision
was erroneously made and focusing solely on prejudice. Resp’t Br., p. 19. However, Bonner
County’s reasonableness is not judged solely on its attorney’s litigation tactics. Reasonableness in
the context of a fee award under Idaho Code § 12-117(1) looks at Bonner County’s underlying
conduct outside of court during the hearing before the Board, the issuance of the Decision, and the
judicial review and appeal process. See Cty. Residents Against Pollution From Septage Sludge
(CRAPSS) v. Bonner Cty., 138 Idaho 585, 589, 67 P.3d 64, 68 (2003) (upholding the district court’s
fee award under Idaho Code § 12-117(1) and awarding additional fees on appeal because Bonner
County, through its Board, “acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law” when it arbitrarily
dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commission); see
also Hauser Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser, 162 Idaho 260, 265, 396 P.3d 689, 694
(2017) (awarding fees against the City of Hauser because the City “acted with no reasonable basis
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in fact or law” based on conduct outside of court and prior to litigation, specifically, “attempting
to enforce its code outside City limits”); Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.3d
340, 345 (2004), overruled on separate grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277
P.3d 353 (2012) (awarding fees against Cassia County for conduct outside of court and prior to
litigation, specifically, because “the County did not have a reasonable basis in fact or law when it
enacted” a zoning ordinance challenged by Reardon); Schweitzer Basin Water Co. v. Schweitzer
Fire Dist., 163 Idaho 186, 194, 408 P.3d 1258, 1266 (2017) (citing Syringa Networks, LLC v.
Idaho Dept. of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 831, 367 P.3d 208, 226 (2016)) (“Where an agency has no
authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”).
In this case, the Board and Bonner County have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law by arbitrarily granting the Variances in violation of clear statutory provisions and without
evidence in the record to support granting the Variances. See R. Vol. 1, pp. 87–104. The Hungates
articulated nine separate reversible errors committed by the Board. The Board does not have
authority to grant a variance unless the applicable standards are met and supported by evidence.
Here the Board’s grant of the Variances exceeded its authority. Just like the above-cited cases,
Bonner County, through its Board’s arbitrary action, has acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law. The Hungates have defended their property rights at the Board by seeking reconsideration,
at the district court on intermediate appeal, and now on appeal to this Court. The Hungates have
been forced to incur significant costs and fees to protect their property and the use thereof because
of the Board’s improper and arbitrary Decision that its own legal counsel deems indefensible.
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Because Bonner County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the Hungates are entitled
to attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-117 below and on appeal.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Hungates respectfully request this Court reverse the district court, set aside the Board’s
Decision, and award the Hungates reasonable attorney fees and costs before the district court and
on appeal.
DATED: January 4, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
/s/ Deborah E. Nelson
Deborah E. Nelson
Jeffrey W. Bower
Attorneys for Appellants
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